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Small Consumer Claims* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, Direct Digital, LLC, a manufacturer of nutritional 
supplements, released Instaflex, a “revolutionary” formula that was 
intended to relieve joint pain.1 The company advertised that the 
product was “scientifically formulated” to “relieve discomfort,” 
“improve flexibility,” “increase mobility,” and “support cartilage 
repair.”2 One bottle of Instaflex Joint Support containing ninety pills 
costs $69.99—a small price to pay for the promised benefits.3 
Consumers who planned on taking multiple pills daily as 
recommended likely bought multiple bottles.4 Given the frequency of 
those purchases, as well as the fact that the bottles themselves are 
relatively inexpensive, it is also likely that few consumers kept 
receipts proving when and where they bought Instaflex.5 There was 
also no evidence that retailers selling Instaflex kept records of who 
purchased it on any given date.6 
This lack of recordkeeping did not seem problematic until the 
truth behind the pills was revealed. Despite Direct Digital’s grand 
claims of the supplement’s health benefits, Instaflex’s primary active 
ingredient is glucosamine sulfate, meaning the pill contains little more 
than sugar.7 Consumers expecting to purchase a nutritional 
 
 *  © 2016 Sarah R. Cansler. 
 1. Instaflex Advanced, INSTAFLEX, http://www.instaflex.com/products/joint [http://perma
.cc/2PRN-4X6Q]; see Instaflex® Joint Support Featured On ‘The Doctors’ Television 
Program, PRWEB, http://www.prweb.com/releases/Instaflex/Doctors/prweb11355816.htm 
[http://perma.cc/F9A7-KVUM] (displaying a Nov. 21, 2013, Instaflex press release). 
 2. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting statements 
from Instaflex labels and marketing materials), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). 
 3. See INSTAFLEX, supra note 1. 
 4. See id. (recommending a dose of three pills a day for four weeks to begin to 
achieve “significant relief”); cf. Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for 
Class Certification at 5–6, Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-01829 (N.D. Ill. May 
27, 2014), 2014 WL 10337752 (quoting class member’s sworn declaration documenting his 
daily use of Instaflex). 
 5. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155018, at 
*2–3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014). 
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supplement that would relieve their joint pain instead received a 
placebo, making it highly unlikely that Instaflex could live up to its 
billing.8 
One Instaflex purchaser, Vincent Mullins, felt that the product 
was “phony” and fraudulently advertised.9 But like many other 
Instaflex purchasers, he had no proof that he had purchased or used 
Instaflex.10 He brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois seeking a refund and to impose appropriate fines 
on Direct Digital, to compensate Instaflex purchasers for allegedly 
fraudulent marketing.11 Because the value of his claim was small 
compared to the cost of litigating the suit by himself, Mullins needed 
to certify a class to successfully pursue his claim.12 Courts have 
established two approaches to class certification—exemplified by 
decisions from the Third and Seventh Circuits—which would each 
result in radically different outcomes for Mullins’s suit. 
Under the first rule, created by the Third Circuit and since 
adopted by several other circuits, Mullins would not have been able 
to certify a class unless potential members could show objective proof 
of their Instaflex purchases.13 Heightened ascertainability requires 
that the class representative define proposed classes based on 
objective criteria and that plaintiffs demonstrate a “reliable and 
administratively feasible” means of determining class membership.14 
Proposed classes that lack objective evidence to prove membership, 
 
 8. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658. 
 9. Mullins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155018, at *1, *7. 
 10. See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Class Certification, 
supra note 4, at 1. Mullins claims he purchased Instaflex at a GNC with cash, did not keep 
his receipt, and threw the bottle away less than two weeks later. Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 5–7, Direct Dig., LLC v. Mullins, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (No. 15-549). 
 11. Mullins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155018, at *7–8. 
 12. See William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities 
Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 709 (2006) (discussing 
how the plaintiffs in a large class action suit likely would not have been able to litigate 
their small claims without the class action device). 
 13. See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[A] 
class is not ascertainable unless the class definition contains objective criteria that allow 
for class members to be identified in an administratively feasible way.”); Byrd v. Aaron’s 
Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2015) (describing the history of the heightened 
ascertainability requirement in the circuit); Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 
2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Without an objective, reliable way to ascertain class 
membership, the class quickly would become unmanageable	.	.	.	.”); Weiner v. Snapple 
Beverage Corp., 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79647, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
3, 2010) (“A class is ascertainable when defined by objective criteria that are 
administratively feasible	.	.	.	.”). 
 14. Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163. 
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such as business records or receipts, often fail under the heightened 
ascertainability requirement.  
Alternatively, some courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have 
followed a different approach.15 Fearing that the heightened 
ascertainability requirement would make it unduly difficult to certify 
certain types of class actions—effectively destroying entire categories 
of claims—the Seventh Circuit flatly rejected it.16 Instead, the court 
relied on its own “weak” definition of “ascertainability,” holding that 
the inquiry should revolve around the adequacy of the class definition 
itself, not any potential difficulty in identifying individual class 
members.17 Under this standard, potential class definitions should be 
screened only for vagueness, objectivity, and whether the class is 
defined in terms of success on the merits.18 Consequently, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld the certification of Mullins’s proposed class.19 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision created a circuit split, inviting the 
Supreme Court to settle these competing interpretations of 
“ascertainability.” However, the Court denied certiorari in Mullins 
and allowed the Seventh Circuit’s decision to stand. The decision to 
deny review may have more to do with internal Supreme Court 
politics in the wake of Justice Antonin Scalia’s death than the merits 
of the case.20 Nonetheless, the denial comes as something of a 
surprise. Prior to Mullins, the Court’s recent class action certification 
decisions suggest support for the Third Circuit’s heightened 
ascertainability requirement. Those decisions emphasize that class 
certification requires a close investigation into whether a proposed 
class meets the requirements for certification and whether the 
relevant claims can be litigated effectively and efficiently as a class 
 
 15. See, e.g., Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 524–27 (6th Cir. 2015); 
Mullins v. Direct Dig., 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 
(2016). Both the Seventh and Third Circuits refer to the requirement of a “	‘reliable and 
administratively feasible’ way” to identify class members as the “heightened 
ascertainability requirement.” See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657; Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 
154, 172 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J., concurring). This Recent Development adopts the 
same language. 
 16. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657–58. 
 17. Id. at 659. 
 18. Id. at 659–60. 
 19. Id. at 674.  
 20. See Amanda Bronstad, To Defense Bar’s Dismay, SCOTUS Rejects Review of Class 
Action, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202751230219/To-
Defense-Bars-Dismay-SCOTUS-Rejects-Review-of-Class-Action?slreturn=20160208195552 
[http://perma.cc/SA74-DX7Y] (noting that Justice Scalia “authored some of the Supreme 
Court’s most pivotal class action cases” and that his death leaves the Court’s conservative 
wing without a “clear path to five votes	.	.	.	.”). 
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action.21 The Court has written that a class action must be 
“maintainable” to achieve class certification and that proposed class 
definitions require a “close look” to ensure that a class action is the 
most appropriate form in which to bring the claim in question.22 More 
recently, the Court held that class certification was only appropriate 
after a “rigorous analysis” of the requirements for certification, 
providing implicit support for a strict certification requirement like 
heightened ascertainability.23 Consequently, this Recent 
Development argues that the Supreme Court should resolve the split 
between the Third and Seventh Circuits by adopting the heightened 
ascertainability requirement. This rule serves as a useful tool for 
ensuring that class actions function efficiently and successfully, a 
concern that even the Seventh Circuit recognizes is crucial to the class 
action device.24 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly discusses how the 
class action device has developed in recent decades, allowing 
heightened ascertainability to gain a foothold as a certification 
requirement. Part II provides the factual context for the Seventh 
Circuit’s rejection of the requirement. Part III then analyzes why the 
heightened ascertainability requirement effectively addresses the 
policy concerns surrounding class actions. Finally, Part IV considers 
the issues that the heightened ascertainability requirement leaves 
open and evaluates how the Supreme Court should interpret the rule 
to balance the efficiency of class actions with the need to certify 
certain types of class actions. 
 
 21. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (emphasizing that 
certification is only appropriate when a court is satisfied after “rigorous analysis” that all 
of the prerequisites for certification have been satisfied); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“[Class action] claims must depend upon a common 
contention	.	.	.	.	That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is 
capable of classwide resolution	.	.	.	.”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 
(1997) (noting that the Rule 23 amendments governing class actions emphasize that class 
actions should “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense”). 
 22. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 614–15. 
 23. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1432; see also Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (holding that 
plaintiffs seeking certification under Rule 23 must “affirmatively demonstrate” that the 
class complies with the requirements for certification (emphasis added)). Scholars have 
also viewed the holding in Wal-Mart as making class certification more difficult to obtain. 
See Max Helveston, Promoting Justice Through Public Interest Advocacy in Class Actions, 
60 BUFF. L. REV. 749, 750–51 (2012) (“[In Wal-Mart], the Court subjected the proposed 
class to an increased level of scrutiny and appears to have raised the bar for all future 
groups seeking class certification.”). 
 24. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658 (“A court must consider ‘the likely difficulties in 
managing a class action,’ but in doing so it must balance countervailing interests to decide 
whether a class action ‘is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.’	” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3))). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1382 (2016) 
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I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS ACTIONS 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, originally 
passed in 1938, governs the procedure and administration of class 
action suits.25 However, the modern version of the rule developed out 
of amendments adopted in 1966.26 The Advisory Committee designed 
those amendments to address certain problems that the previous 
version of the rule had created. Specifically, the Advisory Committee 
sought to eliminate the original rule’s “overly formal” categories for 
class actions and to expand the scope of the available types of classes 
and claims.27 
The amended Rule 23(a) outlines four prerequisites that any 
class must meet to be certified: (1) “numerosity” of parties, (2) 
commonality of legal or factual issues, (3) typicality of the named 
plaintiff’s claim compared to the rest of the class, and (4) adequacy of 
the named plaintiff’s representation of the class.28 These prerequisites 
apply to every type of class actions that can be brought under Rule 
23.29 Rule 23(b)(3) describes the most common type of class action: an 
action in which legal or factual questions “predominate” over any 
individual questions of law or fact, rendering the class action device 
“superior” to other methods of adjudicating the claim fairly and 
efficiently.30 Plaintiffs like Mullins often bring small consumer claims 
through this type of class action.31 
 
 25. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know 
Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 405 (2014). 
 26. See Mullenix, supra note 25, at 405. 
 27. See Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 
1204, 1213–14 (1966). The 1938 version of Rule 23, in relevant part, identifies three 
different types of class actions: (1) where plaintiffs wish to litigate a shared claim; (2) 
where adjudication of the claims will or may affect specific property involved in the action, 
even if the claims are not the same; and (3) where there is common law or fact among 
different claims and a common form of relief is sought. See, e.g., John G. Harkins, Jr., 
Federal Rule 23—The Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 705, 707 (1997). Some courts viewed 
these three types as strict classifications for class actions, while other courts expanded the 
classifications to achieve pragmatic solutions. See Cohn, supra, at 1214. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Mullenix, supra note 25, at 425. 
 29. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b). The two other types of class actions, not discussed 
in this paper, are found in Rule 23(b)(1) (when separate actions would create 
incompatible standards for parties defending a class action, or when the interests of 
individuals not parties to the litigation would be affected by the action) and Rule 23(b)(2) 
(when plaintiffs seek declaratory or injunctive relief rather than money damages). FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(b); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §	23.40(1) (3d ed. 2015). 
 30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Louis W. Hensler III, Class Counsel, Self-Interest 
and Other People’s Money, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 53, 60 (2004) (“Most attempts to certify 
cases in federal court now invoke Rule 23(b)(3)	.	.	.	.”). 
 31. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29, §	23.21[5][e]. 
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The requirements for certification in Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) 
demonstrate the Advisory Committee’s effort to ensure that the 
amended rule did not sacrifice efficiency or ease of administration in 
managing the class action device.32 The Supreme Court has preserved 
this emphasis on managing the class action in its decisions addressing 
certification of 23(b)(3) class actions. In Amchem Products v. 
Windsor,33 the Court wrote that Rule 23(b)(3) class actions balanced 
the interests of class members who would not have brought claims on 
their own with “systemic efficiency.”34 The Court noted that Rule 
23(b)(3) provides a “nonexhaustive” list of factors courts could use to 
determine whether the class fails the predominance requirement, 
including the potential interest of class members in controlling the 
litigation individually and potential difficulties in managing the class 
action.35 In Amchem, the Supreme Court denied certification for a 
class bringing asbestos-related claims because of the probable 
difficulty of managing the wide variety of claims brought by various 
class members.36 
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue again in 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,37 finding that a proposed class failed the 
predominance requirement for certification under Rule 23(b)(3).38 In 
explaining its holding, the Court wrote that Rule 23(b)(3) applied 
when a class action is “not as clearly called for,” meaning that the 
Court must take a “close look” at whether common questions 
predominate to determine whether a class action is appropriate and 
manageable.39 This in-depth analysis of proposed class definitions 
suggests that classes should be defined narrowly enough to avoid 
unwieldy and inefficient class actions.40 
These decisions advance a theme in class action jurisprudence: 
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions must be efficient and manageable to 
 
 32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment 
(“Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve 
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons 
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other 
undesirable results.”). 
 33. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 34. Id. at 615. 
 35. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A), (D). 
 36. See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 625. 
 37. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 38. See id. at 1433. 
 39. Id. at 1432–33. 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 1432; Elena Kamenir, Comment, Seeking Antitrust Class 
Certification: The Role of Individual Damage Calculations in Meeting Class Action 
Predominance Requirements, 34 GEO. MASON L. REV. 199, 225 (2015). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1382 (2016) 
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justify litigating claims collectively.41 Many circuit courts recognize an 
implied prerequisite for certification that is not found in the text of 
Rule 23, requiring that classes must be “ascertainable” or specific 
enough to identify who might be a member of the class using 
objective criteria.42 Some courts have gone further, adopting a 
heightened ascertainability rule requiring both objective evidence and 
a “reliable and administratively feasible” method to determine class 
membership based on that evidence.43 By focusing on the ease of 
determining putative class members, this requirement seeks to ensure 
that class actions can be efficiently managed, in keeping with the 
Supreme Court’s approach in Amchem and Behrend.44 But some 
courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Mullins, have refused to adopt 
the heightened ascertainability requirement, fearing that it might 
indiscriminately bar certain claims.45 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF MULLINS V. DIRECT DIGITAL 
The plaintiff’s proposed class definition in Mullins v. Direct 
Digital, LLC46 gave the Seventh Circuit an opportunity to evaluate 
the effect that the heightened ascertainability requirement would 
have on a small consumer claim.47 In Mullins, plaintiff Vince Mullins 
sued defendant Direct Digital for fraudulently misrepresenting 
“Instaflex” as a medicine for joint pain relief, claiming that the 
product was little more than a sugar pill.48 Mullins sought to certify a 
class of consumers under Rule 23(b)(3),49 defining the class as 
 
 41. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29, §	23.46[1]–[2][a]; David E. Kouba & Carolyn 
A. Pearce, Growing Insistence Among Courts for Ascertainability, LAW360 (July 18, 2014), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/558013/growing-insistence-among-courts-for-
ascertainability [http://perma.cc/NT2C-D9QD]. 
 42. See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing 
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 2013)); EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 
F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592–94 
(3d Cir. 2012)); Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 139 (1st Cir. 2012); John v. 
Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Initial Pub. Offerings 
Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2006); 1 WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & 
HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§	3:1, 3:3 (5th ed. 2011); 
5	MOORE ET AL., supra note 29, §	23.21[3][a]. 
 43. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 44. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–33; Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997); 
Kouba & Pearce, supra note 41. 
 45. See Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 524–27 (6th Cir. 2015); Mullins 
v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 U.S. 1161 (2016). 
 46. 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 47. See id. at 659–72. 
 48. Id. at 658. 
 49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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individuals who purchased Instaflex for personal use before the class 
action notice was advertised.50 The trial court granted certification, 
finding that the plaintiff’s class met the requirements of Rule 23(a) 
and (b)(3).51 
On appeal, Direct Digital relied on recent Third Circuit 
precedent applying the heightened ascertainability requirement to 
argue that Mullins’s class should be denied certification. Under Direct 
Digital’s interpretation, Mullins would have been required to show a 
“reliable and administratively feasible way” to determine, using 
objective evidence, whether a putative class member was truly part of 
the class.52 Because Mullins’s putative class members were unlikely to 
be able to prove that they purchased Instaflex through objective 
evidence like retail records or receipts, Direct Digital argued that the 
class definition failed to meet the heightened ascertainability 
requirement.53 However, the Seventh Circuit refused to adopt the 
heightened ascertainability standard and affirmed certification,54 
concluding that Mullins’s class definition met the certification 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3).55 
In doing so, the Seventh Circuit formulated its own standard, 
requiring only that Mullins’s class definition meet the implicit 
requirement of “weak” ascertainability recognized in that circuit.56 
That weaker standard requires that for certification (1) the class not 
be too vaguely defined, (2) the class definition not be based on 
subjective criteria, and (3) the class not be defined “in terms of 
success on the merits.”57 The court affirmed the district court’s grant 
of certification because Mullins’s class met these requirements.58 
 
 50. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658. 
 51. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155018, at *5, 
*10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014) (“Plaintiff’s class is ascertainable because it is objectively 
contained to all individuals who purchased Instaflex for personal use during the class 
period and the class period is finite.”); see also 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 42, §	1:2 
(discussing the prerequisites for class action certification). 
 52. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661–62.  
 53. See id. at 661. 
 54. Id. at 672. 
 55. Id. at 660–61. 
 56. The Seventh Circuit does acknowledge an implicit requirement that a class be 
clearly defined based on objective criteria, or “ascertainable,” in order for a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class to be certified. Id. at 659. It does not, however, recognize the additional element 
imposed by the heightened ascertainability requirement: that class members be 
determined in a “reliable and administratively feasible way.” Id. at 662. 
 57. Id. at 659–60. A class definition based on the success of the merits is also called a 
“fail-safe class,” where class members are only identifiable if the defendant is liable. Id. at 
660. A classic example of a “fail-safe class” is one including all individuals who were 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1382 (2016) 
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Specifically, the court emphasized that the class definition 
identified a particular group of individuals (“purchasers of 
Instaflex”), harmed in a certain way (“defrauded by labels and 
marketing materials”), during a specific time period 
(“purchased	.	.	.	within the applicable statute of limitations of the 
respective Class States	.	.	.	until the date notice is disseminated”).59 
The definition was not based on subjective criteria because it focused 
on the class members’ action of purchasing the product and the 
defendant’s conduct regarding the labeling and marketing of the 
product.60 Nor was the class defined on the success of the merits, such 
as by limiting the scope of the class to those who the defendant 
defrauded.61 Because the class satisfied both the explicit requirements 
of Rule 23(b)(3) and avoided the pitfalls that the Seventh Circuit 
recognized as fatal to class certification, the court upheld Mullins’s 
class certification and refused to adopt the heightened ascertainability 
requirement. In rejecting that rule, the Seventh Circuit highlighted 
several concerns that the rule would pose were it to be adopted by the 
Supreme Court.62 
III.  THE CIRCUITS’ ANALYSES OF HEIGHTENED 
ASCERTAINABILITY 
The Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the heightened ascertainability 
requirement focused primarily on the potentially problematic effects 
that the rule would have on small consumer claims.63 In this type of 
class action, where members are unlikely to be able to show proof of 
purchase through records or receipts, imposing such a requirement 
would almost always result in a denial of certification.64 Without 
objective records, plaintiffs would be hard pressed to develop a 
“reliable and administratively feasible” method to prove class 
membership.65 In essence, the Seventh Circuit refused to adopt 
heightened ascertainability because it “effectively bars low-value 
consumer class actions,” at least where putative class members do not 
 
“wrongfully” harmed by the defendant. See Erin L. Geller, Note, The Fail-Safe Class as an 
Independent Bar to Class Certification, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2012). 
 58. Id. at 660–61. 
 59. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660–61; Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155018, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014). 
 60. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661. 
 61. Id. at 660; see 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29, at §	23.21[3][c]. 
 62. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661–62. 
 63. See id. at 662. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1382 (2016) 
2016] HEIGHTENED ASCERTAINABILITY 1391 
have documentary proof of their membership.66 Without the option of 
bringing a class action, those small consumer claims would be too 
costly to pursue individually, leaving many potential plaintiffs with no 
way to pursue their claims.67 
By contrast, courts like the Third Circuit that require heightened 
ascertainability reason that the requirement eliminates the 
administrative burdens of determining class membership, provides 
the best possible notice to absent class members, and ensures that 
individuals bound by the judgment are clearly identifiable.68 This 
“forward-looking view” of certification focuses on how a court will 
manage the class action as it proceeds and whether the class will 
actually function as a class.69 By requiring proof that putative class 
members can identify themselves through a “reliable and 
administratively feasible” method, the heightened ascertainability 
requirement seeks to ensure that class actions are manageable 
without requiring courts to resort to extensive “mini-trials” to 
determine who is a class member.70 Thus, notwithstanding the denial 
of certiorari in Mullins, the heightened ascertainability requirement 
otherwise appears to satisfy the jurisprudential focus of the Supreme 
Court and others on class action manageability and efficiency—an 
element the Seventh Circuit’s standard downplays.71 
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit reasoned in Mullins that the 
various policy rationales supporting the heightened ascertainability 
requirement fail to justify its adoption because that requirement 
makes it nearly impossible to certify small consumer claims.72 But 
while the requirement does preclude certification for claims without 
objective evidence of class membership, it does so to prevent 
inefficient and unmanageable class action proceedings that would 
require defendants to challenge each putative member’s claim 
without proof.73 This Part evaluates the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of 
how heightened ascertainability works and demonstrates that the 
actual effects of heightened ascertainability are necessary to maintain 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See, e.g., id. at 665; Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 
2004) (“[O]nly a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”).  
 68. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 69. See Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 70. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 305. 
 71. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658 (reasoning that heightened ascertainability wrongly 
gives the manageability factor “absolute priority” over other considerations); supra notes 
32–40 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 668. 
 73. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307. 
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the important goals of manageability and efficiency in class action 
litigation. 
A. Administrative Convenience 
The ease with which a court can administer a class action has 
long been recognized as a crucial concern in certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class action.74 The Seventh Circuit began its analysis in Mullins by 
recognizing this concern in favor of adopting the heightened 
ascertainability requirement—namely that it furthers administrative 
convenience in a Rule 23(b)(3) action by ensuring that a class action 
is the “superior” method “for fairly and efficiently” addressing the 
claims at hand.75 The Third Circuit has said that heightened 
ascertainability, because it focuses on accurately and efficiently 
identifying class members, “eliminates serious administrative 
burdens” that work against the efficiencies required for a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action.76 
Because the putative class members in Mullins would have no 
way to prove that they purchased the product at the certification stage 
without extensive fact-finding, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
such a class could not be certified under the heightened 
ascertainability requirement due to the “administrative costs and 
headaches” that would be required to determine class membership.77 
The court reasoned that the requirement forced judges to view 
administrative concerns “in a vacuum,” causing them to deny 
certification without considering the fact that, despite administrative 
concerns, a class action may be the only way for small consumer 
claims to be effectively litigated.78 Thus, instead of requiring 
heightened ascertainability, the Seventh Circuit maintained that the 
explicit efficiency requirement and the manageability factor of Rule 
23(b)(3) are sufficient to ensure that a class action is the superior 
vehicle for litigating the individual claims.79 
 
 74. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997) (“The 
development [of class action practice] reflects concerns about the efficient use of court 
resources	.	.	.	.”). 
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663 (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. 
Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
 76. Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012). Whether a 
class action is “efficient” includes, in particular, considerations of whether the issue being 
litigated is common to all class members, as well as the “likely difficulties” in the 
management of a class action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3)(D); Helveston, supra 
note 23, at 759. 
 77. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663. 
 78. See id.; supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 79. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1382 (2016) 
2016] HEIGHTENED ASCERTAINABILITY 1393 
This fear that courts would deny certification of small consumer 
claims due to administrative concerns is not entirely unjustified. 
Applying the heightened ascertainability requirement, the Third 
Circuit denied certification for a proposed class of small consumer 
claims under Rule 23(b)(3), similar to the class proposed in Mullins.80 
The plaintiffs in Carrera v. Bayer Corp.81 purchased a diet pill of 
dubious effectiveness and were equally unlikely to have proof of 
purchase such as product packaging or receipts.82 The Third Circuit 
seized on this deficiency, holding that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the 
ascertainability requirement if determining membership would 
involve “individualized fact-finding or mini-trials.”83 This confirms the 
Seventh Circuit’s concern that small consumer class actions like 
Mullins or Carrera would fail because of the difficulty of efficiently 
determining class membership.84 Furthermore, the outcome in 
Carrera is not an isolated incident; many classes have failed the 
heightened ascertainability requirement because of a lack of 
manageability or administrative feasibility in identifying class 
members.85 
However, these cases also suggest ways that the plaintiffs can 
define their classes in an ascertainable and manageable way—one 
that satisfies the heightened ascertainability requirement even in a 
class action for small consumer claims.86 Although the Seventh Circuit 
 
 80. Compare id. at 658 (proposing a class action against the seller of dietary joint 
supplements for allegedly engaging in fraudulent advertising), with Carrera v. Bayer 
Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013) (proposing a class action against Bayer for 
allegedly claiming that a diet pill enhanced metabolism). 
 81. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 82. Id. at 304. 
 83. Id. at 304, 307 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d 
Cir. 2012)). 
 84. See, e.g., Mullins, 795 F.3d at 664; Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307. 
 85. See, e.g., Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“[T]he District Court properly found that individual inquiries would be required to 
determine whether an alleged overbilling constituted unjust enrichment for each class 
member. Such specific evidence is incompatible with representative litigation.”); 
Sethavanish v. ZonePerfect Nutrition Co., No. 12-2907-SC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18600, 
at *17 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014) (“Plaintiff has yet to present any method for determining 
class membership, let alone an administratively feasible method.”). But see Byrd v. 
Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 170 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The Byrds’ proposed method to ascertain 
[class members] is neither administratively infeasible nor a violation of Defendants’ due 
process rights.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Sethavanish, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18600, at *17 (“[I]n some cases, 
retailer or banking records may make it economically and administratively feasible to 
determine who is in (and who is out) of a putative class.”); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage 
Corp., 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79647, at *41 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) 
(“Plaintiffs offer no basis to find that putative class members will have retained a receipt, 
bottle label, or any other concrete documentation of their purchases of Snapple beverages 
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feared that the heightened ascertainability requirement will cause 
courts to “err systematically against certification,” the rule is not as 
harsh as the Seventh Circuit indicated.87 Although Mullins did not 
present any receipts or records during the certification process,88 a 
plaintiff providing such objective evidence ensures that determining 
class membership will not require individualized fact finding for each 
putative class member, and the class definition can meet the 
heightened ascertainability rule.89 
But if putative class members cannot provide objective proof of 
their claims, a class action can become unwieldy, requiring that 
defendants engage in “mini-trials” to challenge each putative class 
member’s claim that they belong in the class.90 By requiring putative 
members to have some objective evidence proving their membership 
at the certification stage, the heightened ascertainability requirement 
avoids lengthy and costly litigation that undermines Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
efficiency requirement.91 Consequently, the heightened 
ascertainability rule, with its focus on administrative convenience in 
determining class membership, fits within the Supreme Court’s focus 
on manageability as a crucial requirement for certification.92 
B. Unfairness to Absent Class Members 
Another consideration in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action proceeding 
is the requirement that class members be provided with notice of the 
pending class action. Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires that, for any class 
certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must provide to class 
members the “best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances,” which allows these class members to avoid being 
bound by a final decision in the proceeding if they choose to litigate 
 
bearing the ‘All Natural’ description.”). For further discussion about ways that plaintiffs 
might be able to meet the heightened ascertainability standard, see infra Part IV. 
 87. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 664. 
 88. See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Class Certification, 
supra note 4, at 1. 
 89. Courts have not yet identified a bright-line rule as to what types of objective 
evidence meet the heightened ascertainability requirement; however, they have accepted 
retailer records, receipts, and government records. See, e.g., Byrd, 784 F.3d at 169 (finding 
that the proposed class was ascertainable because there were “objective records” including 
government and retailer records that could “readily identify” class members); Xavier v. 
Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“In order for a 
proposed class to satisfy the ascertainability requirement, membership must be 
determinable from objective, rather than subjective, criteria.”). 
 90. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 91. See id. at 307–08; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 92. See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text. 
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the claim individually.93 According to the Seventh Circuit, a central 
premise of the heightened ascertainability requirement is that all class 
members must be readily identifiable so that they will receive actual 
and personal notice of the class action—ensuring that they can opt 
out.94 
Assuming as the Seventh Circuit did that there were no records 
or proofs of purchase to show who was a member of the class defined 
in Mullins, there would be no way to provide actual notice to each 
individual putative class member because the parties could not 
identify their names and contact information. If heightened 
ascertainability requires actual notice, then Mullins (and other 
proposed classes where potential members may lack records to prove 
their membership) would fail the heightened ascertainability 
requirement, and the court would deny certification.95 
This actual notice requirement does not flow from Rule 
23(c)(2)(B), which mandates that courts provide the “best notice that 
is practicable under the circumstances” and only requires individual 
notice for members who can be identified through reasonable 
efforts.96 The Seventh Circuit noted that some class members may be 
impossible to identify, which is why the Rule does not generally 
require actual notice.97 By linking certification to actual notice and 
requiring the class representative to contact each and every possible 
member of a proposed class, the heightened ascertainability 
requirement would create a very high bar for small consumer claims. 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit feared that strict adherence to the 
 
 93. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see 3 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 42, at §§	8:5, 
9:39. 
 94. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2015) (“If the 
identities of absent class members cannot be ascertained, the argument goes, it is unfair to 
bind them by the judicial proceeding. A central premise of this argument is that class 
members must receive actual notice of the class action so that they do not lose their opt-
out rights.” (internal citations omitted)), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). While Rule 
23(c) requires that notice be provided to all class members in a Rule 23(b)(3) action, it 
does not require actual notice to each individual class member. FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(c)(2)(B). 
 95. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665 (“[Rule 23] recognizes it might be impossible to 
identify some class members for purposes of actual notice.”). 
 96. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
 97. See, e.g., Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665; Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil 
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. 
REV. 356, 396 (1967) (“In particular cases it may be practicable to give notice under (c)(2) 
which will reach each member of the class. That will not be possible in all cases	.	.	.	.”). 
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requirement’s actual notice requirement would render such class 
actions impossible to certify.98 
But heightened ascertainability does not insist on actual notice. 
The Third Circuit has emphasized that the heightened ascertainability 
requirement facilitates, rather than ignores, the “best notice 
practicable” requirement under Rule 23(c)(2)(B).99 For example, in a 
case involving a Rule 23(b)(3) class action against a cell phone 
provider, the Third Circuit wrote that “[w]here names and addresses 
of members of the class are easily ascertainable,	.	.	.	due process would 
dictate that the ‘best notice practicable under the 
circumstances	.	.	.	would be individual notice.’	”100 In the absence of 
records to facilitate member identification, individual notice is not 
always required because it may not provide the best notice under the 
circumstances. When class members are asked to provide receipts to 
prove their membership, it may be impossible to identify members 
before production of those receipts. Therefore, the “best notice 
practicable” in such a situation may be to post a sign in the retailer’s 
store.101 
Furthermore, even if only a few class members choose to opt 
out,102 the heightened ascertainability requirement maintains this 
fundamental right of class action litigation while balancing the need 
to facilitate the best possible notice to class members.103 Rather than 
denying certification if every class member cannot be provided 
personal notice, requiring objective evidence to prove class 
membership preserves members’ opt-out rights by identifying as 
many members as possible. Thus, a lower burden to provide notice to 
each individual class member outweighs the higher evidentiary 
burden placed on proving class membership because it maximizes the 
number of class members who can be reasonably notified. The 
heightened ascertainability requirement efficiently and accurately 
 
 98. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665 (“When it comes to protecting the interests of absent class 
members, courts should not let the perfect become the enemy of the good.”). 
 99. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §	21.222 (2004)). 
 100. Larson v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 687 F.3d 109, 126 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Greenfield v. Village Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973)). 
 101. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29, §	23.102[3]. 
 102. See Francis E. McGovern, Second-Generation Dispute System Design Issues in 
Managing Settlements, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53, 61 (2008) (discussing a case in 
which only 15.65% of actual class members elected to opt out of the class action upon 
receipt of notice). 
 103. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that due 
process requires that an absent class member be provided with the opportunity to opt out 
of a class action); Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593. 
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facilitates the notice requirement, while preserving the right of 
individuals to opt out of the class action. 
C. Unfairness to Defendants and to Bona Fide Class Members 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit addressed the argument that the 
heightened ascertainability requirement ensures that bona fide class 
members’ recovery will not be diluted by false or inaccurate claims.104 
Courts applying the heightened ascertainability requirement have 
expressed concern that, in cases like Mullins where there is no 
objective evidence, class membership determination would amount to 
little more than accepting each putative member’s “say-so.”105 In the 
absence of objective evidence, class members may have to rely on 
more subjective methods of identification such as affidavits to prove 
their membership.106 But, as the Third Circuit noted, affidavits 
present problems for both defendants and for bona fide class 
members.107 Forcing defendants to simply accept affidavits as proof of 
class membership, without any kind of verification, would not be 
“proper or just.”108 Furthermore, the use of affidavits without further 
verification could result in the submission of fraudulent or erroneous 
claims that would dilute the pro rata share of any recovery for bona 
fide class members.109 
Consequently, courts that have adopted heightened 
ascertainability require that when class members use affidavits to 
prove membership those affidavits must be verified in some way to 
ensure that there are no fraudulent claims.110 The Third Circuit has 
recently explained that a plaintiff should present a model of how to 
reliably screen affidavits for honesty and accuracy.111 Another court 
has adopted a slightly broader requirement, requiring a “specific 
proposal as to how identification via affidavit would successfully 
operate	.	.	.	.”112 Because a class like the one in Mullins did not show 
 
 104. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 666 (7th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 1161 (2016) (citing Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
 105. Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594; see also Perez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 262, 
269 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (noting that affidavits are “uncorroborated and self-serving 
evidence”). 
 106. See Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594. 
 107. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 108. See Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 (quoting Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. 
Supp. 2d 1075, 1089–90 (N.D. Cal. 2011)). 
 109. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310. 
 110. See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 948–49 (11th Cir. 2015); 
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 311. 
 111. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 311–12. 
 112. Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 949. 
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any records or documents to prove class membership, the plaintiff 
would have to present some kind of successful model for screening 
those affidavits.113 
The Seventh Circuit took issue with this approach to affidavits, 
finding that it renders them “insufficient as a matter of law” because 
of the challenges of demonstrating a successful model for screening 
affidavits that is unique to each case.114 The court held that, as long as 
defendants have a chance at the claims administration phase to 
challenge the validity of each affidavit, they have not been denied due 
process.115 The court also noted two problems with denying 
certification based on an assumed risk of dilution. First, there is no 
“empirical evidence” to suggest that there would be enough 
fraudulent or erroneous claims of membership to have an effect on 
bona fide class members’ recovery—especially because so few class 
members claim recovery at all in a class action.116 Second, using 
affidavits may be the only way that individuals with real claims can 
prove membership in a class.117 If courts denied certification based on 
a fear that using only affidavits as evidence of class membership 
would allow fraudulent claims and dilute recovery, then class 
members with valid claims but no objective evidence could recover 
nothing at all.118 
There is little evidence suggesting a high risk of fraudulent claims 
diluting recovery, especially because so few class members submit 
claims to recover at all.119 This may apply to class actions like Mullins, 
in which the class is pursuing a consumer fraud claim and is asking for 
the defendant to refund the cost of every problematic product sold 
 
 113. A successful model for screening affidavits must reliably determine the veracity of 
the affidavits and must be specific enough to allow the defendant to challenge how the 
model attempts to determine veracity. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 311–12. However, courts 
have not yet approved a model that meets these requirements, making it difficult to 
determine exactly what such a successful model might look like. See infra note 127 and 
accompanying text. 
 114. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). 
 115. Id. at 669 (noting that a defendant does not have a “due process right to a cost-
effective procedure for challenging every individual claim to class membership”). 
 116. See id. at 667 (citing Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(Rendell, J., concurring)). 
 117. See id. at 668–69. 
 118. Id. at 668 (“To deny class certification based on fear of dilution would in effect 
deprive bona fide class members of any recovery as a means to ensure they do not recover 
too little.”). 
 119. See McGovern, supra note 102, at 128 (noting a case in which the response rate for 
claims in a class action was 0.45% in the first six months). 
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and to pay appropriate fines.120 If damages (excluding fines) will be 
determined by the number of refunds to be issued, a handful of 
fraudulent or erroneous claims are unlikely to significantly dilute the 
recovery of bona fide class members.121 
But this is not the case for every class action or every class action 
involving small consumer claims. For example, in Marcus v. BMW of 
North America,122 the class sued BMW for tires that “ha[d] gone flat 
and been replaced” and for bodily injuries caused by this defect.123 
Because these claims required proof that the tire went flat because of 
a manufacturer defect rather than some external cause (such as a nail 
on the road), BMW could have been forced to pay damages to those 
who had submitted fraudulent or erroneous affidavits.124 Moreover, 
verifying the cause of each flat tire would involve the exact sort of 
“mini-trial” that the heightened ascertainability requirement was 
designed to avoid. Although these fraudulent or erroneous claims 
would not harm bona fide class members in such a situation, the 
claims would certainly harm defendants by forcing them to pay 
damages in excess of their liability, which even the Seventh Circuit 
noted would violate the defendants’ right to due process.125 
Heightened ascertainability undeniably makes it more difficult to 
use affidavits as proof of class membership, but the requirement does 
not necessarily render affidavits “insufficient as a matter of law.”126 
Courts that have applied the heightened ascertainability requirement 
to the use of affidavits have consistently held that affidavits can be 
used as long as the plaintiff can demonstrate a successful screening 
method to weed out fraudulent or erroneous affidavits.127 But those 
 
 120. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 670 (observing how most consumer fraud class actions involve 
a “common method” for determining damages and how other methods can determine 
damages in the aggregate); see also Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 309 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“Carrera argues that he can prove at trial that Bayer owes a refund for every 
purchase of WeightSmart.”). 
 121. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 666–69. 
 122. 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 123. Id. at 590. 
 124. See id. at 603–04 (discussing how damages determined by the cost of replacing 
each flat tire is dependent on what caused each tire to go flat). 
 125. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 672. 
 126. See id. at 668–69. 
 127. See Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 79647, at *17–18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2010) (“At the class certification stage, 
plaintiffs may demonstrate that these elements are susceptible to generalized proof by 
disclosing a suitable methodology. When plaintiffs attempt such a showing, however, they 
must demonstrate that the proposed methodology can be applied class-wide and ‘that they 
could, at trial, marshal facts sufficient to permit them to rely upon’ the proposed 
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courts have not yet approved a successful model or given an example 
of what a successful model might look like.128 Thus, while it remains 
unclear what models would pass muster under heightened 
ascertainability, these cases do not render affidavits per se 
inadmissible.  
Nonetheless, in some types of class action claims it is important 
to screen out fraudulent or erroneous affidavits to prevent defendants 
from paying more than they owe and to promote a more manageable 
process for identifying class members by reducing the number of 
putative class members a defendant must challenge.129 In this sense, 
the heightened ascertainability rule’s emphasis on an 
“administratively feasible” model to screen out false or erroneous 
affidavits serves a critical role by ensuring that defendants can 
efficiently and effectively challenge class membership and limit their 
liability to bona fide class members. The Supreme Court has written 
that without specificity in the class definition a defendant does not 
know how to properly defend the case.130 The heightened 
ascertainability requirement creates that specificity so that defendants 
can efficiently exercise their right to challenge proof of class 
membership and limit their damages.131 
IV.  HANDLING THE EFFECTS OF THE HEIGHTENED 
ASCERTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT 
Although the heightened ascertainability requirement supports 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s intended purpose of balancing the efficiency of class 
 
methodology.” (citations omitted) (quoting McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 
215, 229 (2d Cir. 2008))). 
 128. See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(“Because Karhu had not himself proposed an affidavit-based method, he necessarily had 
not established how the potential problems with such a method would be avoided. 
Without a specific proposal as to how identification via affidavit would 
successfully	operate, the district court had no basis to accept the method.”); Carrera v. 
Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 2013) (remanding the case to allow plaintiff to 
propose a successful model without stating what that model should look like). 
 129. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 672; cf. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 
(2013) (holding that any model supporting a plaintiff’s damages must be consistent with its 
liability case, or “[q]uestions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm 
questions common to the class”). 
 130. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982) (citing Johnson v. 
Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125–27 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., 
concurring)). 
 131. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 309; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 360–67 
(2011) (stating that the defendant had a right to individualized determinations of class 
members’ right to employee back-pay and that defendant could assert individualized 
defenses accordingly). 
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actions, it still likely prevents certification for claims like that in 
Mullins. Due to the lack of objective evidence in that case, such as 
receipts, labels, or retailer records proving purchase of Instaflex, the 
class cannot meet the heightened ascertainability rule’s requirement 
that putative class members have objective proof of their 
membership.132 
The heightened ascertainability requirement was designed to 
improve the efficiency of class actions for small consumer claims, as 
well as to allow defendants to challenge potentially fraudulent claims 
made by individual class members.133 Some have argued that the 
requirement’s emphasis on objective evidence creates the unfair 
result of keeping some valid claims out of court.134 However, the 
Mullins court itself recognized that only a “tiny fraction” of putative 
class members file claims, valid or not, to recover the small amount of 
damages they can expect from these small consumer claims.135 With so 
few putative class members pursuing claims in the first place, even if 
the heightened ascertainability requirement bars classes like that of 
Mullins from certification, it will only affect a few potential claimants. 
Moreover, the limited case law suggests possible workarounds 
for the few class members with valid small consumer claims who 
intend to participate in the class action. A concurring opinion from 
the Eleventh Circuit suggests that affidavits might at least 
approximate objective evidence for certain small consumer claims 
involving readily identifiable products.136 Additionally, the Third 
Circuit’s opinion in Carrera left the door open for a possible, if not 
yet discernable, way to prove that a model for screening affidavits 
would be successful.137 The court suggests that proof of the model’s 
success might serve as sufficiently objective evidence that could 
 
 132. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661 (reasoning that it is unlikely that customers would 
have kept their receipts in this inexpensive transaction). 
 133. See supra Sections III.A, III.C. 
 134. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to 
Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 312–13, 330 (2009) 
(“[T]he ascertainability requirement readily sacrifices both deterrence and compensation 
in favor of an alternative value, namely, ensuring that compensation does not flow to 
uninjured parties.”). 
 135. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 668; see also Geoffrey M. Wyatt, 7th Circ. Stands Out on 
Ascertainability of Class Actions, LAW360 (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles
/710549/7th-circ-stands-out-on-ascertainability-of-class-actions [http://perma.cc/9RF5-N8S6]. 
 136. See Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 952–53 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, 
J., concurring). 
 137. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310–11 (3d Cir. 2013); supra note 126–28 
and accompanying text. 
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satisfy the heightened ascertainability requirement.138 These 
approaches suggest that, at least under particular circumstances, there 
may be ways for putative class members with small consumer claims 
to meet the heightened ascertainability requirement despite the 
outcome in Mullins. 
A. Limited Use of Affidavits 
Courts that have adopted the heightened ascertainability 
requirement emphasize that affidavits alone are insufficient to meet 
the requirement of objective proof of class membership.139 If a 
plaintiff with a small consumer claim would have difficulty recalling 
the details of when she purchased the product in question, or even 
were she to purchase the exact product, an affidavit would be an 
unreliable evidentiary source.140 Since affidavits in such cases are 
often based on individuals’ subjective memories,141 these courts are 
unwilling to consider them as the kind of objective evidence that 
prevents the filing of false claims and allows defendants to challenge 
individual class membership.142 
However, in a recent concurring opinion, Judge Beverly B. 
Martin of the Eleventh Circuit suggests one possible way to use 
affidavits under the heightened ascertainability requirement.143 When 
the value of the claims is low and individuals can easily determine for 
themselves if there are potential class members, affidavits alone might 
meet the heightened ascertainability requirement.144 Where the 
potential recovery is small, unscrupulous would-be class members are 
less likely to file a fraudulent affidavit because the risk of perjury 
 
 138. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 311. 
 139. See Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 948–49; Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 153–54, 170 (3d 
Cir. 2015); Carrera, 727 F.3d at 309–10. 
 140. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 309 & n.5 (noting that the named plaintiff in the case 
could not remember when he purchased the product in question and confused the product 
with similar products on the market). 
 141. See Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(stating that an affidavit swearing to a class member’s smoking history was inherently 
subjective because it was based on an estimate of cigarettes smoked over a certain time 
period). 
 142. See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting 
that affidavits force defendants to rely on absent persons’ declarations as true). 
 143. See Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 952–53. 
 144. Id. Individuals may have a difficult time determining whether or not they 
purchased a product when “a challenged product is similar to other unchallenged products 
on the market[.]” Id. at 953. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1382 (2016) 
2016] HEIGHTENED ASCERTAINABILITY 1403 
outweighs the potential reward.145 Furthermore, defendants might be 
able to more readily defend against the validity of individual claims 
that use affidavits as evidence if the defendants can question the 
putative class member about a specific and easily identifiable 
product.146 And because so few putative class members are likely to 
file claims, the defendants could do so without sacrificing the 
efficiency of the class action proceeding because they would have to 
defend fewer claims.147 Under these circumstances, affidavits may 
approximate objective evidence because some of the subjectivity 
concerns about a class member’s memories are removed when 
defendants can challenge the individual’s memory about a specific 
product.148 
While the limited use of affidavits may help some small 
consumer claims meet the requirements of heightened 
ascertainability, they would be ineffective in cases such as Mullins. 
There are a variety of Instaflex-brand pills on the market,149 and it is 
possible that putative class members may not know which pills they 
purchased. This fact suggests that the claims themselves may be weak 
and that administering a class action suit would be costly and 
ultimately ineffective.150 When class members are unable to recall 
whether they purchased the product in question, let alone provide 
proof of purchase, they probably cannot prove their claims in court at 
all—whether litigating in a class action or individually.151 
 
 145. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 667 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (citing Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, 
J., concurring)).  
 146. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 309 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that 
defendants cannot challenge affidavits in instances where the putative class members 
cannot accurately recall their relevant purchases); cf. Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 (“Forcing 
BMW and Bridgestone to accept as true absent persons’ declarations that they are 
members of the class, without further indicia of reliability, would have serious due process 
implications.” (emphasis added)); Godec v. Bayer Corp., No. 1:10-CV-224, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 131198, at *23 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 11, 2011) (noting that defendants can present 
defenses against individual claimants). 
 147. See Wyatt, supra note 135. 
 148. See Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 953. 
 149. See INSTAFLEX, supra note 1 (listing a variety of Instaflex products, including 
Instaflex Joint Support, Instaflex Advanced, and Instaflex Bone Support). 
 150. See Randolph v. J.M. Smucker Co., 303 F.R.D. 679, 687 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (noting 
that because there were so many different types of Crisco oil on the market, the plaintiffs 
might have difficulty determining which type they purchased, creating “substantial 
difficulties” for the administration of the class action). 
 151. See Kouba & Pearce, supra note 41 (“If an individual is not a class member, that 
person cannot rely [on] any common findings of liability or share in any judgment in favor 
of the class. Thus, without proof that they are a class member, a claimant cannot prove 
that defendant is liable to him or her.”). 
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However, one can easily envision a class action involving 
consumer claims about a unique but relatively inexpensive product.152 
Under different facts, certain small consumer claims may not be 
completely barred from certification if they can use affidavits in a way 
that closely approximates objective evidence like receipts or records. 
B. Proving the Reliability of Affidavit Screening Models 
Although the Third Circuit has refused to permit the use of 
unverified affidavits in heightened ascertainability cases, the court 
nonetheless indicated one way that putative class members might use 
affidavits to prove class membership. In Carrera, the Third Circuit 
rejected the plaintiff’s proposal of a method to screen the accuracy 
and truthfulness of affidavits on the basis that there was no proof of 
the proposed method’s reliability or effectiveness.153 The court 
remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to submit a specific screening 
model and to show how the model could reliably determine the 
veracity of the affidavits in question.154 These requirements would 
ensure that defendants have the opportunity to challenge the validity 
of the screening model of the affidavits, rather than engaging in 
“mini-trials” about the validity of each individual affidavit.155 They 
would also prevent defendants from having to face “satellite 
litigation” about who is bound by the final judgment when the class 
was not sufficiently definite.156 Finally, these requirements would 
prevent fraudulent or erroneous claims from diluting bona fide class 
members’ recovery, so that those members will not receive less than 
they deserve.157 Essentially, clear evidence of a successful model for 
screening affidavits might be sufficiently objective to satisfy the 
heightened ascertainability requirement.158 
 
 152. One example might be a unique food product like the Kinder Surprise Egg, which 
is inexpensive but poses a possible choking hazard because, while the hollow egg is made 
of chocolate, within it is a plastic container with a toy inside (although this particular 
product is banned in the United States). See Kathleen Caulderwood, Kinder Surprise 
Chocolate Eggs Brought into Corporate Battles, Gun Debates, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 10, 
2014, 6:53 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/kinder-surprise-chocolate-eggs-brought-corporate
-battles-gun-debates-1597618 [http://perma.cc/TWU4-XZAZ]. 
 153. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 154. Id.  
 155. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–94 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 156. Id. at 593 (citing 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 42, §	3:1). 
 157. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310. 
 158. Cf. Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J., concurring) 
(“We have precluded class certification unless there can be objective proof—beyond mere 
affidavits—that someone is actually a class member.”). 
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But the court’s opinion provided no indication about what a 
successful model might look like.159 Plaintiffs apparently would have 
to demonstrate the model “in action” at the certification stage, which 
may create a challenging evidentiary burden.160 Without such a 
demonstration of the model, the opinion expresses doubt that a 
screening model could satisfy the heightened ascertainability 
requirement.161 The court notes that the proof of the model’s success 
must be more than “mere assurances” that the model will work.162 
Furthermore, such a model must be specific to the case in question, 
rather than a general model that does not screen for the particular 
facts or legal theories of the case.163 
Although Carrera has ostensibly described a way that affidavits 
can be used in small consumer claims, it remains to be seen what a 
successful screening model would look like. However, assuming that a 
plaintiff can demonstrate a successful model to a court that has 
adopted the heightened ascertainability requirement, Carrera at least 
obliquely suggests a way that small consumer claims lacking other 
objective evidence like receipts or records can still meet the 
requirement. 
The discussed proposal may provide an answer as to how some 
small consumer claims can be successfully adjudicated as class actions 
under the heightened ascertainability requirement. Classes like the 
one in Mullins may generally be barred under the requirement due to 
their lack of objective evidence and the difficulty of identifying 
whether putative class members purchased the product in question. 
However, the heightened ascertainability requirement may allow for 
some flexibility for certain small consumer claims involving low-cost, 
unique products or claims that can demonstrate a successful affidavit 
screening model. 
 
 159. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 311. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. at 311–12. 
 163. See id. at 311.  
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CONCLUSION 
Although the Seventh Circuit insisted that heightened 
ascertainability has the “effect of barring class actions,” especially in 
cases involving small consumer claims,164 the Third’s Circuit’s 
application of heightened ascertainability suggests that there may be 
more room for successful small consumer claims.165 Nonetheless, 
heightened ascertainability makes it more difficult for small consumer 
claims to be certified as class actions. 
If the Supreme Court reaches this issue and adopts the 
heightened ascertainability requirement, it would likely do so because 
the Rule 23(b)(3) focuses on the efficiency and manageability of class 
actions—a central concern in class certification.166 But in order to 
prevent heightened ascertainability from keeping classes like that of 
Mullins from being certified, the Court should also consider the types 
of evidence that classes may use to prove certification under the 
heightened ascertainability requirement. In the absence of accessible 
records or individual proof of purchase, this may mean permitting 
disinterested third-party affidavits, defendant cross-examination of 
randomly selected affiant class members, or affidavits alone in cases 
where the value of the claims are low and individuals can easily 
identify themselves as class members.167 
Considering such evidence allows claims without documentary 
evidence to proceed, while ensuring that the “proposed class will 
actually function as a class.”168 But regardless of the evidence the 
Court may permit in class certification, the heightened 
ascertainability requirement remains a valuable tool for securing the 
efficiency and manageability of class actions in cases involving small 
consumer claims. By requiring putative class members to somehow 
prove their membership at the certification stage, the heightened 
 
 164. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 1161 (2016). 
 165. See supra Parts I–II. 
 166. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658 (“A court must consider ‘the likely difficulties in 
managing a class action,’ but in doing so it must balance countervailing interests to decide 
whether a class action ‘is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.’	” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(d))); see also FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“Subdivision (b)(3) 
encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, 
and expense	.	.	.	.”). 
 167. See Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., 
concurring). 
 168. Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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ascertainability rule ensures that small consumer claims comply with 
one of Rule 23(b)(3)’s most important purposes: to “achieve 
economics of time, effort, and expense” through class actions.169 
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